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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court is authorized by Section 78-2A-3(h), Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as. amended) to hear this appeai from the. Second
District Court for Weber County.

This is an action to recover

under a real estate: contract.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by ruling in favor of

Defendant Thomas K. Welch on his Motion for Summary Judgment when
Defendant Welch had received payments from an assignee of the
uniform real estate sales contract even though he claims that the
subsequent assignees abrogated his liability on the contract by
dealing directly with the sellers.
The standard of review to be applied to this issue is
correctness without deference to the trial court because where
there have

been no assessment of the credibility of witnesses or

their competence to testify, the appellate court is in as

good a

position as the trial court to find the facts based upon the
written record.

In Re Infant Anonvmous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988).
2.

Whether the trial court erred by granting summary

judgment in favor of the Defendants when the ultimate fact of a
contract change should have been given to the jury.
The standard of review on this issue is again the
correctness of

the trial court's decision without deference.

In

Re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
3.

Whether summary judgment was appropriate when a question
1

of fact existed concerning the existence of a contract between
Defendant Welch and Plaintiffs. The standard to be used to
evaluate the lower court's ruling is whether a question of fact
raised by the pleadings or affidavits.

Grow v. Marwick

Development. Inc.--. 621 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-21-1 (1953 as amended):
M

In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal
property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as
due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or
for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury,
unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered."
Utah Code Annotated. Section 79-21-2 (1953 as amended):
"All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury other
than those mentioned in the next section (Sec. 78-21-3) are
to be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to be
addressed to them except when otherwise provided."
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-21-3 (1953):
"All questions of law. including the admissibility of
evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, the
construction of statutes and other writings, and the
application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by
the Court and all discussions of law addressed to it.
Whenever the knowledge of the Court is by law made evidence
of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the
jury, who are bound to accept it."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-40-1 (1953):
"An action may be brought by any person against another who
claims an estate or interest in real property or an
interest or claim to personal property adverse to him. for
the purpose of determining such adverse claim?
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal of the trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment

to Defendant Thomas K. Welch, thus granting him

dismissal from this case.
b.

Course of the Proceedings and disposition at the trial
Court

The Plaintiffs brought this action to reclaim all rents and
profits under the uniform real-estate contract and to regain
possession of the contr_act. Thomas Welch cress-claimed
against Paul W. Stone. Thomas Welch moved for summary
judgment against the Plaintiffs see3<ing to be dismissed from
the action citing the personal dealings between the
Plaintiffs and Defendant Stone as an abrogation of his
liability on the contract.

The Court granted the Motion

for Summary Judgment.
c.

Relevant Facts

The Plaintiffs owned a particular piece of property in
Washington Terrace. Utah where two eightplexes are located.
By way of a Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract the
Plaintiffs sold the property to Tom Thorpe who assigned his
interest to Thomas K. Welch, who in turn sold or assigned
his interest to Paul Stone.

Stone defaulted on a least two

occasions, Stone later solved the defaults and made an
additional agreement with the Plaintiffs to pay an
additional amount to do so. Thomas Welch has received
payments from Paul Stone in the past, but claims that his
3

liability has been abrogated by the Plaintiffs and Stone
dealing directly with each other, and agreeing for Stone to pay
more money than the original contract allowed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment to Thomas Welch and dismissing him from the case. Welch
had an interest in the property that needed to be determined
because he had received payments from Defendant Stone, who had
defaulted.

This action was brought to collect all amounts due

and to regain possession of the property because of the failure
of Stone to make his payments as required under the contract.
Since Welch had received money from him. the court needed to
determine whether any of such sums should have been turned over
to the Plaintiffs.
or potential

This undetermined liability presents

a cloud

cloud on the Plaintiffs title and they have a right

to have that cloud removed.
Claimants in a quiet title action have the right to

a trial

hy jury to determine their rights and a question upon which the
whole case depends is whether or not the dealings between the
Plaintiffs and Stone had abrogated the original contract and
produced another one. This is an ultimate fact which should have
been allowed to go to the jury which was requested

in this case.

Instead the trial court dismissed the action without allowing the
ultimate question of fact to be resolved by the legitimate
finders of fact in this case.
Summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine fact
existed concerning the existence of a
4

contract between Defendant

Welch and Plaintiffs.
required by

Plaintiffs never completed the acts

law to forfeit Stone's interest in the property when

he defaulted, thus no forfeiture took place and

Welch's contract

still binds him.
ARGUMENT
I.

A PERSON WHO HAS AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY HAS THE
RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION TO HAVE A POTENTIAL OR
PRESENTLY EXISTING CLOUD ON HIS TITLE REMOVED OR
ENJOINED.
RECEIVING PAYMENTS ON THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION CONSTITUTES SUCH A CLOUD.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the

right of

someone who has a claim to property to quiet title against
present or potential clouds on that title.
U.S. 300. 310 (1890).

A11en v. Hanks. 136

The Court in Hanks said:

" . . . Now what remedy at law is adequate to the relief
she seeks, and to which she is entitled if these lands
constitute her separate estate and may not be taken for
her husband's debts?
She is in possession and therefore
cannot bring ejectment. Must she remain inactive while
the sale proceeds, and until the purchaser obtains and
has recorded the marshal's deed to her lands, and then
bring an action to have the deed canceled and the sale
set aside, as clouds upon her title?
It needs no argument
to show that the existing levy upon the ape 1 lee's land
constitutes itself a cloud upon her title, which. if not
removed and the proposed sale prevented, will injure the
salable value of the lands.
and
otherwise
affect
her
The Court went on to say:
"So in Hinchley v. Greanv. 118 Mass. 595, 598:
Plaintiff is not required to wait until somebody
obtains a title under a sale before he can seek his
remedy".

'The

In the present case the Defendant Welch has received
payments in the past on the property in question from Defendant
Stone.

Certainly other persons knowing of the receiving of the

payments by Welch would or could assume that he has some interest

5

in the

subject property, if not ownership.

ownership of those funds received by

Also at issue is the

other than

the Plaintiffs.

As in Hanks above must the Plaintiffs sit back until the
Defendants seek action to receive more money from the contract,
or until

they have spent it all and made it harder to collect if

.it is determined to be owed to them?

Or must they wait until

creditors of Welch or Stone seek after the property to satisfy
judgments against them before they secure their rights in this
piece of property?

No. the U.S. Supreme Court in a precedent

setting case which has never teen overturned, has recognized that
the property owner in a esse

like this can and should seek to

have their property interests adjudicated.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S ACTS TOWARD FORFEITURE OF THE PROPERTY WERE
NEVER COMPLETED. THUS NO FORFEITURE TOOK PLACE AND
WELCH WAS NEVER RELEASED FROM HIS OBLIGATIONS ON THE
CONTRACT.

In Utah the Courts require the landowner to

comply strictly

with the forfeiture provisions in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract and to give two distinct types of notices in order to
forfeit the buyer's interest.

For Example the Court of Appeals

of Utah has said, quoting the Utah Supreme Court
n

In order to forfeit a purchaser's interest under a
uniform real
estate contract. the seller must comply
strictly with the notice provisions of the contract.
The provisions in
the uniform real estate contract
are not
self-executing, and to enforce them.it requires some affirmative act on the part
of the seller
to notify the buyer of what specific provision in the
contract the seller is proceeding under and state what
the buyer must do to brina the contract current. Grow
v.Marwick Dev. Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249. 1251-52 (Utah 1980)."
Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah App. 1987)
The Adair court went on to say,
6

M

. . . Furthermore, even if the January letter was
not insufficient in this respect, it is only one of
two notices that must be given to the buyers in order
tc work
a
forfeiture
pursuant to this contract.
Although it could have sufficed as a notice of default
required by Paragraph 16-A of the contract it could not
also serve as a notice of forfeiture, which the sellers
were required to provide as sufficient notice of their
election to terminate the- contract and to forfeit buyers'
interests. Fuhuriman v.Bisseacrer . 13 Utah 2d 379. 375
P.2d 27 (1962); Leone v.Zuniaa. 84 Utah 417. 34 P.2d 699
(1934). "Adair, at 745 P.2d

853.

In the instant case the Plaintiffs only gave one notice in
each of the defaults, which would have notified the Defendants
of the Plaintiffs' desire

to forfeit the land if not cured

within the period of time given in the notice.

The Plaintiffs

according to Adair above would also have to give a notice of
forfeiture to confirm that the Plaintiffs not only had elected to
take the forfeiture option, but had done so.

Otherwise

the Utah

Courts have held that the Plaintiffs would not have complied with
the contract notice provisions and could not have actually
forfeited the property under the contract.
Another requirement to effect a valid forfeiture is to name
the specific amount to be paid and the performance required of
the defaulting party, and to give the buyer a reasonable time to
cure the default

First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell.

659 P.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Utah 1983).

In the present case the

notice only gave the buyer five days to cure the default, which
according to other cases is not or may not be a reasonable amount
of time to cure the dafault.
at 853.

See e.g.. Adair V. Bracken, supra.,

In Fuhriman v. Bisseaer. 13 Utah 2d 379. 375 P.2d

(1952). the court allowed 60 days because the notices to the
Defendant were confusina. and the Defendant was of slow

7

intelligence and would not have had adequate notice even if the
Plaintiff had closely followed the contract requirements.
One final principle relative to forfeitures is the often
repeated phrase
forfeiture."
(1951).

that the courts nwill only reluctantly declare a

Petersen v. Hodcres. 121 Utah 72. 239 P. 2d 181

In the instant case the Plaintiff did not allow a

reasonable amount of time, five days is hardly enough time to
come up with a great, deal of money.

They only gave one notice

where :he courts clearly require a notice of default or intent to
declare forfeiture and also a second notice that a forfeiture has
beer, declared and is in effect. There was no

forfeiture in this

case because of Plaintiff's failure to follow required
procedures, thus the contract did not end as argued by the
Defendant Welch and his obligation could not have changed.

III.

BY GRANTING DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT THE TRIAL COURT EFFECTIVELY DENIED THE
PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO A TRIAL EY A JURY ON AN
ISSUE INVOLVING THE TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY

The Courts and the legislature in Utah guarantee
owner the

a property

right to a jury trial on issues involving the title to

real estate.

Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-21-1 (1953); Rule

38 Utah R. Civ. P. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d
114. 15 fUtah 1988); Holland v. Wilson. Utah 2d 11. 327 P.2d 250.
251 (1958).

Specifically the Utah Supreme Court said:

. . . There is a right to a jury trial on all
questions of
fact in any action to determine
the right to possession of real property. Hoi land
v. Wilson. 8 Utah 2d 11. 14-15/327 P.2d 250. 252
(1958); See Utah Code Ann. Section, 78-21-1 (1987);
Utah R. Civ. P. 38 (a).n Hansen v. Stewart. 761
P.2d 14. 15 (Utah 1988).
8

In Holland V. Wilson the Court said:
". . . W e are of the opinion that where the question
is presented as to the right to possession, the right
to a jury -rial is quaranteed." 321 F.2d at 252.
Thus it is plain that in a case such as the present one
which involves the possession of property the Plaintiffs had a
right to a trial by jury on the question.

That right was

foreclosed by the Court's grant of Welch's summary judgment
motion.

The trial court erred in so denying a trial on an issue

of fact concerning real property.

Plaintiffs brought

the action

not only to declare and receive rents and payments, but also to
regain possession of the premises.
Involved in the determination of whether there is right to a
jury trial is also the question of whether the issues are ones of
fact, and whether an ultimate fact is to be determined.

This

principle can be seen by the above quotation from the Hansen case
expounding the right to a jury trial in
cases.

real property possession

As the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

as well as the above cases show, questions of fact are to be
determined by the jury where one has been requested, and
questions of

law are for the judge.

Utah Code Ann. Section. 78-

21-2 (1953).Utah Code Ann. Section 78-21-3 (1953): Rule 38 Utah
R. Civ. P.
In the present case there is one fact that needed to be.
determined upon which the cases of the Plaintiffs and Defendant
Welch depend for success of failure.

The fact of whether a

contract in fact had been changed or abrogated by the agreement
of Stone to pay an additional amount of money.

An ultimate fact

is one that should never be determined by the court but in any
9

case tried to a jury or to be tried to a jury would be reserved
to the jury.

Texas Citv Transp. Co. v. Winter. 222 3.W. 541. 542

(Tex. App. 1920) . Thus, it is clear that the

trial court denied

the Plaintiffs right to a trial by jury on the issue of the
existence of a contract and the right to possession of the
p2-operty under the contract.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT TO BE
DETERMINED 3Y THE COURT.
The Utah Suoreme Court has said:
summary judgment can only be granted when there
is no disoute as to a material" fact. Russell v.
Park City Utah Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 184. 506 ?.2d
1274 (1373): Controlled Receivables. Inc.v. Harman.
17 Utah 2d 420. 413 P.2d 807 (1966) . The purpose
of summary judgment is to save the expense and time
of the parties and the court, and if the party being
ruled against could net prevail when the facts are
looked at most favorably for his position, then
summary judgment should be aranted. Hoibrook Co. v.
Adams* Utah. 542. P.2d 191^(19
75).
If there is a
question of fact raised by the pleadings or affidavits,
the court is precluded from granting summary judgment.
Hatch v. Sucarhouse Finance Co.. 20 Utah"2d 156. 434
P.2d 758 (1967). "Grow, Supra.. at 1252.
In the present case a material fact was whether or not a
contract existed between the Defendant Welch and the Plaintiffs
after the transactions between Stone and the Plaintiffs.

This is

a material fact because it is the whole basis for Welch's defense
that he

is no longer liable on the contract, and because this is

hotly contested by the Plaintiffs. The existence of this one
fact or question of fact is enough to defeat summary judgment,
yet the trial court granted it without giving any detailed
reasonincr for its decision.
10

CONCLUSION
A person with an interest in real property has a right to
bring z

quiet title action to resolve both present and potential

clouds on his title.
continuance of

In this case the unresolved question of the

the contract between Welch and the sellers and of

their receiving payments from Stone is a potential cloud.
Plaintiffs never completed nor followed the requisite acts to
forfeit the interest of anyone in the real
Tnus there

estate involved here.

was no forfeiture and Defendant Welch is still liable

on the contract.

The Plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial on

the issues in this case because it invoivec

the determination of

possession of property. The question of whether a contract
continued between Welch and the Plaintiffs was an ultimate fact
that should have been determined by the jury.

Summary judgment

was not appropriate here because material questions of fact exist
which need to be resolved by the Court.
Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Supreme Court to over turn
the grant of summary judgment in this case and remand for a
trial by jury on the issues of the existence of a contract
between Welch and the Plaintiffs. Welch's liability, who should
have possession of the property, and whether Welch must turn over
the money he received from Stone to the Plaintiffs.

11
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ISSUES AND TRIAL

78-21

78-21-1. Right to jury trial.
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damag
for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jui
unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-21-1.
Cross-References. — Demand for jury
trial, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 38(b).

Right to jury trial Utah Const. Art. I, S
10; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(a).
Waiver of jury trial, Utah Const. Art. h &
10; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consolidation of causes of action.
Discretion of trial court.
Powers and functions of jury.
Quiet title actions.
Rescission of instruments.
Right to jury trial.
Specific performance action.
Consolidation of causes of action.
An order for consolidation, for trial of the
issue of liability, of eleven actions involving
nineteen plaintiffs claiming damages against
the defendants did not violate this section.
Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 327,325
PJ2d 258 (1958).
Discretion of trial court
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant plaintiff a jury trial where
plaintiffs prayer for relief in suit on contract
demanded an accounting and injunctive relief
which provided a basis for equity jurisdiction,
as well as a demand for damages for breach of
contract. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18
Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966).
Powers and functions of jury.
As triers of the facts, jurors have right to
resolve conflicts in evidence and to draw reasonable inferencesfromfacts so found, but they
are not empowered to decide legal questions or
to draw conclusions of law except as guided by
instructions of the court Coray v. Southern
Pac. Co., 112 Utah 166, 185 P-2d 963 (1947),
reversed and remanded on other grounds, 335
U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct 275, 93 L. Ed. 208 (1949).
Quiet title actions.
Under this section all issues of fact relating
to possession of specific real or personal property may be determined by a jury unless a jury
trial is waived, so a plaintiff in an action to
quiet title to mining claims was entitled to a

jury trial on issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson,
Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958).
Rescission of instruments.
In action to rescind instruments by which
defendant purports to have obtained title to ti
property of a plaintiff's ward, the fact that oi
document is the ward's will does not transfer
into a will contest and the court may refbi
the request for a jury trial. Johnson v. Joh?
son, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959).
Right to jury triaL
Right to have a jury pass upon issues of fa.
does not include right to have a cause submi
ted to the jury in hope of a verdict where th
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff :
not entitled to relief. Raymond v. Union Pa"
RJt, 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948).
Defendant was entitled to a jury triai on th
issue of damages, upon his demand, notwith
standing that the paramount object of th
plaintiff's action was to secure an injunctio
and that the claim for damages was but inci
dental to the injunctive relief sought Valle
Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 22
?J2d 739 (1951).
Where there is substantial contradictory en
dence on both sides, the case must be given U
the jury. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204
240 PJ2d 491 (1952).
Upon a subsequent trial of the same cause o
action, a plaintiff seeking damages is bound by
his testimony concerning material and observ
able facts given at the first trial which resuitec
in a nonsuit on the ground of contributory neg

351

78-21-2

JUDICIAL CODE

ligence, and cannot materially change such
testimony in order to offset the defense of contributory negligence. Therefore, the trial court
does not err in refusing to submit the issue to
the jury, and in granting the defendant's motion for a dismissal. Tebbs v. Peterson. 122
Utah 214, 247 P.2d 897 (1952).
Specific performance action.
Granting a jury trial in an action for specific
performance of contract for the sale of land is

not error where issues agreed upon at pretrial
involved more than a mere reading and inter*
pretation of the alleged lease and option; there
were issues as to whether the husband could,
as a sole signatory, bind his nonsigning wife,
whether a memorandum was sufficiently unclear as to justify the introduction of evidence
to clarify it and issues as to intentions of the
parties in executing the agreement. Corbet v.
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318 (1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Right to Civil Jury
Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, Ronan
£. Degnan, 8 Utah L. Rev. 97.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 39,
42, 45.
CJJ&. — 50 CJ.S. Juries §§ 16 to 17, 22.
AJLR. — Right in equity suit to jury trial of
counterclaim involving legal issue, 17
A.L.R.3d 1321.

Statute reducing number of jurors as violative of right to jury trial, 47 A.L.R.3d 895.
Right to jury trial on motion to vacate judgment, 75 A.LJUd 894.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
AXJUth 565.
Key Numbers. — Jury «- 9 to 10V2, 14(2).

78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact.
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned
in the next section [§ 78-21-3], are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence
thereon is to be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-21-2.
Cross-References. — Contents of writings,
recordings and photographs, determinations
for jury, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008.
Court submission of special findings to jury,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a).

Court to charge that the jury are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 51.
Trial by jury or court, Rules of Civil Procedure. Rules 39(a) to (c).
Verdict may be general or special. Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules 49(a), (b), 58A(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consolidation of causes of action.
Drawing of inferences.
Express warranty.
Negative testimony.
Negligence.
Proximate cause.
Right to jury trial.
Consolidation of causes of action.
The term "the jury" does not mean that one
and the same jury must try all the issues in a
case, but means that ail questions offset are to
be decided by the jury impaneled to try such
issues. Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d
327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958).

Drawing of inferences.
While juries are given great latitude in deducing inferences from established facts, they,
nevertheless, are not permitted to base an inference upon an inference, nor may they, without reason, overturn legal presumptions or arbitrarily disregard positive statements of witnesses. Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 P.
1094 (1924).
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ISSUES AND TRIAL
Express warranty.
The question of express warranty is properly
submitted to the jury where the evidence is
substantial and supports the essential elements which the plaintiff is required to prove.
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241
P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952).
Negative testimony.
The weight of negative testimony of witnesses as to the giving of warning signals by
railroad employees ordinarily is for the jury to
determine; but when physical conditions and
the attending circumstances are such as to render it highly improbable that they could make
the observation, the rule is otherwise. Seybold
v. Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 239 P.2d 174
(1951).
Negligence.
Generally the degree of care which a person
must exercise for his own safety is a matter for
the jury. Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah
675, 238 P.2d 416 (1950).
Ordinarily, questions of negligence present
questions of fact to be determined by the jury.
Poulsen v. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P.2d
152 (1952).
Matters cf negligence generally are jury
questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of
such conclusive character as to require all rea-

78-21-3

sonable minds to conclude that the ultimate
fact of negligence does or does not exist. Gibbs
v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213
(1952), afTd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294
(1953).
Proximate cause.
The question of proximate cause is a jury
question. Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah
339, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952).
Matters of proximate cause generally are
jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are
of such conclusive character as to require all
reasonable minds to conclude that the ultimate
fact of proximate cause does or does not exist.
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312,249 P.2d
213 (1952), affd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294
(1953).
Right to jury trial
Right to have the jury pass upon issues of
fact does not include the right to have a cause
submitted to the jury in hope of a verdict where
the facts undisputably show that the plaintiff
is not entitled to relief. Ravmond v. Union Pac.
R.R., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948).Where there is substantial contradictory evidence on both sides, the case must be given to
the jury. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204,
240 P.2d 491 (1952).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 321.
CJ.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial § 203 et seq.
AXJL — Failure to comply with statute
regulating travel by pedestrian along highway

as affecting right to recovery for injuries or
death resulting from collision with automobile,
45 AJLR.3d 658.
Key Numbers. — Trial •» 134 et seq.

78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law.
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings,
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and
all discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is
by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the
jury, who are bound to accept it.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Snpp., 104-21-3.
Cross-References. — Contents of writings,

recordings and photographs, determinations by
court, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008.
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201.
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QUIET TITLE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Partition
§ 136.

C.J.S. — 68 CJ.S. Partition § 136.
Key Numbers. — Partition *» 87.

78-39-49. Interest on advances to be allowed.
Whenever during the progress of the action for partition any disbursement
shall have been made, under the direction of the court or the judge thereof, by
a party thereto, interest must be allowed thereon from the time of making the
same.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ( 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-39-49.

Cross-References. — Interest on judgmenu, § 15-1-4.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Partition
§ 131.

CJ.S. — 68 CJ.S. Partition § 136.
Key Numbers. — Partition •» 87.

CHAPTER 40
QUIET TITLE
Section
78-40-1.
78-40-2.
78-40-3.
78-40-4.
78-40-5.
78-40-6.
78-40-7.
78-40-8.

Action to determine adverse claim
to property — Authorized.
Lis pendens.
Disclaimer or default by defendant
— Costs.
Termination of title pending action
— Judgment — Damages.
Setoff or counterclaim for improvements made.
Right of entry pending action for
purposes of action.
Order therefor — Liability for injuries.
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance
— Foreclosure necessary.

Section
78-40-9.
78-40-10.
78-40-11.
78^0-12.
78-40-13.

Alienation pending action not to
prejudice recovery.
Actions respecting mining claims
— Proof of customs and usage
admissible.
Temporary injunction in actions involving title to mining claims.
Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment
Judgment on default — Court must
require evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment

78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property —
Authorized.
An action may be brought by any person against another*who claims an
estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-40-1.
Cross-References. — Action brought in
county where property situated, § 78-13-1.
Allowance for improvements made under
color of title, §5 57-6-1 et seq.f 78-40-5.

Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const.,
Art. VIE, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Limitations of actions, § 78-12-1 et seq.
Tax sales of real property, $ 59-10-29 et seq.
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UTAH RULES OP C I V I L PROCEDURE
a n advisory jury or, with tha consent of both parties, may order a trial with a
Jury whose verdict has the same effect aa i f trial by j u r y had been a matter of
right.
CoespUer'o Nolee. — Thia rule la similar to
Rula 39, P.R.C.P.

NOTES T O DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

T r i a l by c o u r t

Advisory jury.
—Equity.
Trial by consent.
—Equity.
r r ^ 0 0 « * «Kr«<*ed verdict
Trial by court.
—Waiver of court trial.
- W a l i r a r of jury trial.
Trial by Jury.
—Orant of Jury trial.
——Absence of demand.
—Right.
- — Q u i e t title • « u o n .
Cited.
—Equity.
Whan there is a demand for a jury trial in an
equity eaaa, tha Jury will asrva only la an advisory capacity unlaw bath parties have daarly
soneented to accept a Jury verdict Romrell v.
nana Plrat N a t l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 <Uuh
1980).
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error
by allowing a Jury ta ait In an equity proceedI n * wbara tha jury was retained merely aa an
advisory Jury to consider tha sola question of
tha reasonableness ef plaintiffs reliance on defendant's act. Tolboe Conatr. Co v. Staber Paving a Conatr. Co., 602 P 2d 643 tUtah 1984).
T r i a l by consent
—Equity.
Motion for directed verdict
Where tha case was essentially one in equity
but tha partlee and court appeared to have consented to presenting their caee ta a Jury whose
verdict would have "the same effect a* if trial
by jurv had bean s matter of riifht," under Subdivision <c>. the determination of whether a directed verdict wss proper waa to be tooted by
the same rulee g o w n i n g cases at law. Wll|«rd
v. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cos. 660 P.W 607 I Utah
1976).

—Waiver o f court trial.
Even though former statute providing for
trial by court in abeence of demand for jury
waa couched in mandatory terms, and a party
might have an absolute right to have the issue* tried by tha court, the right could bo
waived, aa by proceeding to trial before a jury.
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. H.*hler, 47
Utah 216. 162 P. 726 I I 9 I 6 I .
—Waiver of Jury trial.
WIM re it did not appear thnt any demand for
a jury trial wae made, or that any objection or
exception waa made at any time during trial
against right of the court to try the rase without a Jury, it would bo presumed on appeal that
a trial by jury waa waived. Perago v. Dodge. 9
U t a h 3 . 3 3 P. 221 (1693).efTd. 163 U S . 160.16
A C ! 9 7 1 . 4 1 L Ed. I I S f 18961.
T r i a l by j u r y .
—Orant of Jury trial.
——Abeence of demand.
Court did not abuse Its dlNcreiion in granting
Jury trial to defendant, under this rula, over
plaintiffs objection* although defendant had
not made proper demand for jury trial under
Rula 38. where plaintiff waa not prejudiced
thereby. Jamas Mfg. Ce. v. Wilson. 16 Utah 2d
210. 390 P 2 d 127 (1964).
-Right
Quiet title action.
This rule gives the right to have any legal
ieaue of fact tried by a jury upon proper demand, and plaintiff in an action to qun-t title to
mining claims wsr entitled to e jury trial on
lesues offset Holland v. Wilson. 8 Utah 2d 11.
327 P.2d 260 II96HI.
Cited In Randall v. Tracy Collins It-net Co..
6 Utah 2d 16, 306 P 2 d 4H0 (lUfVni.

Rule 4 0

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . I d . - 47 Am. Jur 2d Jury I I 67,
68; 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trial I 319 at eeq.
C J . & - 50 C J a Juries I I 96 to 105, 68
C J S Trial I I 20. 203. 547 at eeq.
A . U R . - Whan does jeapudy atuch in a
non-Jury trial. 49 A.L.R 3d 1039.
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b)

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, autherising it to order jury trial notwithstanding
party's failure to make seasonable demand for
J t t r y . ft A L R Fed. 217.
Key Number*. - Jury a - 26; Trial e - 10.
134

3 6 7 et

Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) O r d e r a n d precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for
the placing or actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
lb) Postponement o f the t r i a l . Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and ahall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and
that it may be considered as actually given on the t r i a l , or offered and excluded as.improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
<c) T a k i n g testimony o f witnesses p r e s e n t I f required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same msnner as if at tha
t r i a l ; and tha testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
effect, and subject to tha same objections that may be made with respect to a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) (Rule 32 (cX3)(A) and

Compiler's Notes. — Following ths amendment of Rule 33, enecUve January 1.1967. tha
reference ta Rule tfkcN 11 and (Si, at the end of
Subdivision <e>, should now be to Rule
33tcM3KAl and tBl.

Subdivision (a) of this ruls is similar to Rule
40. F R C P
Croea-ReferoAcea. — Amendment af plead*
Inge to conform to evidence, continuance upoa,
Rule 15(b)

NCTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
» .
.
Postponement.
— Ahm»tM-e of porty
— IMwrrtlon of <iiiirt
- l l l l l l l l l i t y <»f UMIIMH I to attend trial.
Unavoidable ill* nice.
— New theory of :a«e.
—
Procedural delays
—eMippurting
Supporting| affidavits
affVlevits
—Unavailable wi- ness.
Lack of diligence,

Need
Cited.
Postponement.
—Absence of parly.
Continuance would not be granted because
of sbeencs of a party, unleie he was a material
witnese.by
end. if so, the (sets espected to be
proved
*^ him had ta be stated under eath,
unlsss the oath waa waived. Jt was alsa neres*
ssry that party had used due diligence ta be

I fat
109

Rule 38

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

UTAH RULES OP CIVIL

PART VI.
TRIALS.
Rule 38. Jury trial of right.
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or • • given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
Cb) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by Jury of any issue triable of
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the
party.
(c) Same: Specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the
Issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by
jury for only some of the issues, any other party, within 10 daya after service
of the demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand aa required by this rule and to file it aa required by Rule 5(d) constitutes
• waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made aa herein
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — Tht IMtg amend*
Croee-Refereneee. — Constitutional guar*
men! oubetituted "10 days after the service of sntee. Uteh Const, Art. I. 8ec. 10.
ths loot pleading directed la tudt Issus" for
Discretion to order Jury trial In sbeenee sf
••ball be nied by nils of court In which UM demand, Rule 3*tbh
actioetopending" in the first sentence of SubFee for filing demsnd, II 78-3-16 5. 78-424.
division (bl.
Fees sf Jurors, I 216-1 et esq.
• CsmpueVa N o t e s . - This nilstoeimilsrte
Jury provieiene generally. I 76-46-1 et esq.
* Is Si. FJLC.P.
Statutory right Is Jury trial, I 7t 21-1.

Rule 39

remedie* sought in the light of the facta of ths
caae to aecertein which predominates end,
from that eVtennlr.at.on, make Ihs spprepriate
order sa to s Jury sr nonjury trial. Corbet v.
Cos. 30 Utah 2d 361. 617 P.2d 1316 (19741.

Right preserved.

—Appeal from IndustHsl commlaaion.
This trial rule la not applicable to trial do
novo In the district court on sppealfromIndustrial commission's decision on s ses dlecriml*
nation In employment case. Beehive Medical Waiver.
Elece.. Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 663 P 2d 63 —Failure to make written demand.
(Utah 1978).
Failure to make a written demandfora Jury
trial upon the opposing party waives mny error
—Court's dfacretfon.
in a court* failure to grant a Jury trial. Gaeoer
In circumstances where doubt eiiste aa to v.
Home. 657 P2d 164 (Utah 1976).
whether o csuee should be regarded as one in
equity or one In lew, wherein ths party can
Cited in Stickle v. Union Pac. R.R.. 122
Inatot on s Jury ss a matter of right, ths trial Uteh 477, 251 P.2d 667 (1962); Beet v. Huber.
court should have asms discretion and may et* 1 Uteh 2d 177.281 P.2d 206 < 19661; f
smine the nature ef the rights samrted and the Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1968).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. 4ur. 1 4 . - 4 7 Am. Jur. 2d Jury i i 10.
67 to 69. 71, 81. 82. 84te89
CJ.S. - 60 CJB. Juries II 10. 64te113.
A.L.R. — Obtaining Jury trial in eminent
domain; waiver. 12 A.L.R.M 7.
Right la equity suit te Jury Uisl of counterclaim Involving legsl ieoue. 17 A L R 3d 1321.
Issues In garnishment ss triable to court or
to Jury. 19 A LR3d 1393.
Statute reducing number of Jurors ss viola*
tlvs of right to trial by Jury. 47 A.L.R.3d 898.
Authority of state courttoorder Jury trial la
civil case where Jury ha* been waived or not
demanded by parties. 9 A.LRdth 1041.
RighttoJury trial In stockholder** derivative
action. 32 A.LR4th t i l l .
Right to Jury trial in sctlon for declaratory
relief In state court. S3 A.L.R.40) 146.

Jury trial waiver as binding an Ister ststo
civil trial, 48 A L R 4th 747.
Paternity proceedings: right te Jury trial. 61
A L.R-4tb 666.
Right to Jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment, 62 A.L.R.4U)
1141.
Right to Jury trial in etete court divorce proceeding*. 66 A L R 4th 966.
Vslidity sftowsr nils rsquiring stste court
perty who request* Jury trisl In civil case to
psy coete associated with Jury, 68 A L R.4th
343
Rule 38 sf Federal Rule* ef Civil Procedure:
wsived right to Jury trisl s s revived ay
smended sr supplements! plssdJags, 16 A.L.R.
Fed 764
Key Numbers. — Jury e» 10, 26to28.

Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damage*.
Demsnd.
—Time.
Right |
—Appeal from Industrie! commlaaion.
—Court'* discretion.
Waiver.
—Failure to make written demand
Cited.
Damagea.
There ie no right to e Jury trial on the iaeue
ef damagee once <Mnult haa been entered.
Arnica Mut. In* Co. v. Schettler. 76S P.2d 960
(Utah Cl App 19H9I.

Demand.
—Absence.
Court did not sbuee its discretion in granting
Jury trial to defendant under Rule 39(b) over
plaintiff* objection* although defendant had
not mads proper demsnd for Jury trial under
thia nils, where plaintiff wa* not prejudiced
thereby. Jamee Mfr Co. v Wilton. 1ft Utah 2d
210. 390 P2d 127 (19641.
—Time.
Trial court did not ehu*« ita diwmtiun in
denying party'a request for a Jury trial made
four daya prior to trial in violation of diatrtct
court practice rule requiring auch request to be
made at leant 10 daya twfore trial. Dyeon v.
Aviation Office of Am.. Inc.. 693 I'2d 143
(Utah 19791 (decided prior to 1986 amendment).

(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38,
the action shall.be designated upon the register or actions as a jury action. The
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed
with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) By the c o u r t Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of
right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
or all issues.
(c) Advisory Jury and trial by c o n s e n t In all actions not triable of right
by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative mny try any isnoc with

1
21

31
4
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L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341)
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
50 South Main Street
Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 533-0066

MAR 2 71989
DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney at Law

7| Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch
8
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
9
STATE OF UTAH
10
11
12

NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

13

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL W. STONE

14 vs.
15

TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,

16

Defendants.

Civil No. 2698-88

17
18 THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-plaintiff,

19
20
21
22

vs.
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-defendant.

23
24 STATE OF UTAH
25 COUNTY OF
26
27
28

\dJfA

Paul W. Stone, being

ss
first

sworn, deposes and says as

followss

"V;

^y^.H^si

1.

I am Paul W. Stonef also known as Paul Stone, and am a

defendant and cross-defendant in this action*
2.

On or about November 22, 1978, Thomas K. Welch, also

known as Tom Welch, assigned to me his buyer's interest in a
Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 8, 1978, between Nick
and Karyl Faulkner as sellers and Tom C. Thorpe as buyer.

A

true and correct copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
April 8, 1978, between the Faulkners and^ Thorpe is attached as
Exhibit "A."

A true and correct copy of the written assignment

of contract bearing my signature is attached as Exhibit "B."
3.

The real property that is the subject of the Uniform

Real Estate Contract is comprised of two eight plexes located in
Washington Terrace, Utah.
4.

After the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real Estate

Contract was assigned to me I began making payments directly to
the Faulkners as sellers through Weber Valley Bank, the escrow
agent under the contract.
5.

On July 1, 1981, Arealtech Realty (property management)

owned by Lynn Muirbrook was hired to manage the apartments.
management

agreement

was terminated

The

on or about February 1,

1982.
6.

My November

1981 payment to the Faulkners was late.

Shortly after November 30, 1981, I received a notice of default
bearing that date from the Faulkners through the escrow agent.

-2-

1
21
3! The notice demanded that the default be cured and stated that in
4 the event the default was not cured, the Faulkners had elected
5
remedy

61

7
8
9
10|
11

event

14!
15!
161
17!
18!
19

201

under

paragraph

16

of

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

That paragraph provides under remedy "AH that in the

Contract.

default

is not

cured

within

5 days

after

notice,

the

buyer's interest under the contract is forfeited to the seller
as

liquidated

correct

damages. This

copy
M

Exhibit

121
13

"A"

7.

of

the

default

notice

of

was

cured.

default

is

A

true

and

attached

as

C. M
My

January

1982

payment

was

late.

Shortly

after

January 25, 1982, I received notice of default bearing that date
from the Faulkners, again through the escrow agent.
demanded

that

the default

be cured

by February

The notice

1, 1982, and

again elected the remedy of forfeiture under paragraph 16A of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract
not cured.
1982.

I was unable

in the event the default was

to cure the default

A true and correct

by February 1,

copy of that notice of default

is

attached as Exhibit "D. M

21
8.

In the first part of February 1982 I received a letter

221
dated February

1, 1982, from Weber Valley Bank as the escrow

23
agent

under

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract.

That

letter

24
notified me, among other things, that the escrow had been term-

25
inated and the documents held in escrow had been delivered to

26
the

Faulkners.

A

true

and

27
attached as Exhibit "E."

28
-3-

correct

copy

of

that

letter

is

1

2

3]

9.

On or about February

1, 1982, the Faulkners sent a

4

letter to the tenants of the real property being purchased under

5

the Uniform Real Estate Contract

6

their

7
8
9
10|
11

121
13|
14
15

16]
17;

181
19

201
21

rental

payments

to

the

that advised them to remit

Faulkners

as

owners

of

the

property.
10.

The February 1982 rentals that had been collected by

me and the management company that had been managing the real
property

for

me were paid over

to the Faulkners, and Nick

Faulkner collected some of the February 1982 rentals himself. A
copy of a list of those rental payments in Nick Faulkner's handwriting is attached as Exhibit MF.M
11.

I also turned my rent ledger for the real property

over to the Faulkners in February 1982.
12.

Between February 1, 1982, and May 27, 1982, I entered

into negotiations with the Faulkners in an effort to regain my
interest in the forfeited real property.

During those negoti-

ations Nick Faulkner repeatedly said that the Faulkners owned
the property and were entitled to the rents.

During this time

the Faulkners collected all of the rents from the real property

221 in an amount totaling over $12,000.
23

The rents collected are

summarized in the document written and signed by Nick Faulkner,

24
25
26

a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G."
13.

At no time did Thomas K. Welch or Tom C. Thorpe par-

ticipate in my negotiations with the Faulkners to regain my

27
28

-4-

1
2
3
11

interest in the real property, nor were they mentioned as part

ill
of the negotiations.

5II
14.

In

late

May

fil
agreement pursuant

1982,

the

Faulkners

and

I

reached

an

to which I would regain my interest in the

7ll
real property on the terms set forth in the Uniform Real Estate

8ll
Contract except as changed by an agreement dated May 28, 1982.

9|'
A true and

correct

copy of the May

28, 1982, agreement

12 taining the changes is attached as Exhibit "H."

l
lll
13

significant

changes

in the agreement

Among

conthe

was the imposition of a

14 $7,000 "penalty" to be added to the principal balance due and an
15

additional $3,000 added to the principal in lieu of

immediate

16 payment of $1,500 in "out of pocket costs" that the Faulkners
17 required be paid as a condition to regaining my interest in the
18 real property.

The terms regarding the Faulkners1 remedy in the

19 event of default were also changed.

Under

the new agreement

20 between the Faulkners and myself, -in the event I was unable to
21 make the payments when due, the Faulkners1 sole remedy was for22 feiture of the buyer's interest.
23 remedy

under

the

new

purchase

There was
agreement.

to be no , other
See

paragraphs

24 numbered 3, 4 and 5 of the May 28, 1982, agreement, attached as
25 Exhibit "H."
26

15.

A new escrow

agreement

was entered

into with Weber

27 Valley Bank, the Faulkners and me as part of the new purchase
28 agreement. A true and correct copy of the escrow agreement is
attached as Exhibit "I."
-5-

1
2
3
4

16.

As part of the new agreement with the Faulkners, I

also required that they notify the tenants of the real property

5

that I had regained my interest in the property.

6

Nick Faulkner signed and delivered to me a notice to be passed

7

on to the tenants dated May 27, 1982# a true and correct copy of

8

which is attached as Exhibit "J."

9

into the new escrow account as provided in my agreement with the

10
11
12
13
14
15

To that endf

I then began making payments

Faulkners.
17.

In June 1988, the Faulkners initiated the suit seeking

to recover the possession of the real property and to collect
payments toward the balance owed under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.
DATED this 2J_ day of March, 1989.

16
17
CZsts^

1 W. Stone

18
19
20

Subscribed and sworn to before me this of/
1989.

21
22
23
24|| MY commission expires:

/ / - 91?
26
27
28

-6-

day of March,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing Affidavit of Paul W.
Stone, A/K/A Paul Stone was served upon the parties hereto by
mailing a true and correct copy thereof this
1989, to the following:
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P. 0. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
520 26th Street, Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone

-7-

day of March,

RECEIVED
JUL 181989

1

DA' F M L-CV1

o S

2
3
4 L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341)

5 CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

50 South Main Street

6 Eighth Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 533-0066

7 Telephone:

8 Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch
9

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,

10

STATE OF UTAH

11
12 NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
13

FAULKNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

14
15

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.

Civil No. 88090-2698

16 STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,
17

Defendants.

18
19

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-plaintiff,

20
211
22
23

vs.
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-defendant.

24
25
26
27
28

The

motion

of

defendant

Thomas

K.

Welch

for

summary-

judgment in his favor and against the defendants and the related
[motion of defendant Welch

to strike certain portions of the

1
2
3
4 affidavit of Nick Faulkner having been submitted to the Court
5 for consideration pursuant to Rule 4-501, Chapter 4 of the
6 Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, and the Court
7 having considered the memorandums and affidavits filed by the
8 parties and having rendered its written ruling on these motions
9 dated July 12, 1989, it is hereby
10

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

11 Affidavit

of

Nick

and

Faulkner

DECREED

that

Paragraph

is stricken,

except

5 of the

the portion

12 thereof where plaintiff Faulkner admits that the plaintiffs took
13 possession of the property, and summary

judgment

is hereby

14 granted in favor of the defendant Thomas K. Welch and against
15 the

plaintiffs

Nick

Faulkner

and

Karyl

Faulkner

and

the

16 plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the
17 defendant Thomas K. Welch.
18

DATED this

//.

^3ay of

,/

J

19

, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

20
21
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde
District Court Judge

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-2-

1
2
3
4
5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing Summary Judgment was

6 served upon the parties hereto by mailing a true copy thereof,
7 postage prepaid, this / /

day of July, 1989, to the following

8 counsel of record:
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P.O. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
520 26th Street, Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone

DALE M. DORIUS #0903
Attorney for:
P.O. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
723-5219

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER,

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK FAULKNER
AND KARYL FAULKNER
IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(

Plaintiffs,

vs.
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,

1

Defendants.

1

Civil No. 26S8-88

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-Plaintiff,

vs.
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-Defendant.

NICK FAULKNER

and KARYL

FAULKNER being

first duly sorn on

their oath, depose and say as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are

the

sellers

of

certain

real property

under a certain real estate property contract,
2.

Defendants

are

the

original

assignees of the buyer's interest under
Contract.

buyer

and

the Uniform

successive
Real Estate

3.

Plaintiffs

brought

this

action

against

all

the

Defendants in order to recover all installments alleged to be due
under the contracts.
4.

Defendant

WELCH,

Real Estate Contract,
grounds his

has

an assignee of the original Uniform

moved

obligations under

for

Summary

the Uniform

Judgment

on the

Real Estate Contract

had been terminated by previous forfeitures.
5.

Plaintiffs did not make an election

election of remedies never took place.
WELCH has not changed
back from

the escrow;

and Plaintiffs

of remedies

The position of Defendant
have never

for a

while but

place and the contract did not
same possession

as he

the

contract

as

end.

Defendant WELCH
the default

sent.
void

and

whenever the default was cured.

2

Plaintiff entered

no forfeiture or recision took

was before

before any notices had been
treated

received title

therefore, the requirements of forfeiture

were not completed and the contract continued.
into possession

and an

The

is in the

had occurred and

affiants

herein never

did reinstate the contract

DATED this

day of May, 1989.

NICK FAULKNER

KARYL FAULKNER
Subscribed and
1989.

sworn to

before me

this

day of May,

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at _

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed
the foregoing

Affidavit of

a true

Nick Faulkner

and correct

copy of

and Karyl Faulkner to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to Cross-Plaintiff THOMAS
K. WELCH'S

attorney, THOMAS

VUKSINICK at Chapman and Cutler, 50

South Main Street, Eighth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT
copy

to

Cross-Defendant

HUGHES, JR. at

520 26th

PAUL

W.

STONE's

Street, Suite

84144, and a

attorney, DONALD C.

206, Ogden,

UT

this 23rd day of May, 1989.
DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney for Plaintiffs

3

84401,

DAL! M. DORIUS #0903
Attorney for:
P.O. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brighom City, Utah 84302
7235219

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER,

(

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

vs.
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,
Defendants.

1
1[

Civil No. 2638-88

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-Plaintiff,
vs..
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-Defendant.

Plaintiffs,
following

NICK

Memorandum

FAULKNER
in

and

Objection

KARYL FAULKNER, submit the
to

Defendant's

Motion for

Summary Judgment:
ARGUMENT
Defendant WELCH

is still

Plaintiffs never received title
contract was reinstated.

liable under the contract because
back

to

the

property

and the

Defendant is

essentially arguing as part of his theory that

the Plaintiffs' election of
ended

the

contract

and

remedies
thus

his

on

the

original contract

liability.

In answer, the

Plaintiffs argue that H a change in remedies does

not bring about

an election of remedies unless the change involves a prejudice to
the opposing party." Keesee vs. Fetzek, 681 P.2d
App.

1984);

Commercial

Centre

Cal.2D 121, 59 P.2d 978,
Trust, 143

Tex. 621,

982

600, 603 (Idaho

Realty Co. v. Superior Court, 7

(1936);

187, S.W.

Accord

2d 377

advantage has been gained or no

Slay

(1945).

detriment has

vs. Burnett
And "where no

been occasioned,

there is no election." Kessee, supra, at 603; Gridley v. Ross, 31
Idaho 693, 701-02, 217 P. 989,991

(1923).

Thus, as

the action

caused no prejedice to Defendant's rights because the default was
cured and the contract reinstated, no

election of

remedies took

place-.
In

another

case

where

the

vendor

had given a notice of

cancellation or default, the court said:
"In the absence of facts which justify the application
of the election of remedies doctrine, the vendor under
a contract for deed may withdraw his . . . notice of
cancellation before the redemption period has expired."
In the

instant situation

forfeiture before all the
debtor's interest

and the

the Plaintiff
steps

were

withdrew his desire for
finished

agreement continued

situation does not involve facts justify

to

forfeit the

as before.

the application

of the

election or other similar doctrine, so the Plaintiff had the

2

This

right

to

withdraw

his

intention

to

forfeit

the

debtor's

possession.
Notifying
property if

the

assignee

the default

of

was not

contract without receivina any
from the

escrow holder

his

decision

title

or contract

contract and could not
Defendant

WELCH was in

position he had been in before the default had occurred

and before the notice had been sent.
Kessee,

of

end the

prejudice the rights of Defendant WELCHthe same

forfeit the

cured and then reinstating the

documents

did not

to

supra,

at

604, where

in

As the
case

court discussed in

of

forfeiture of the

debtor's possession, the contract instructed the escrow holder to
return all

papers upon

the seller's demand and the seller never

made sucn a demand, the provision
forfeiture was
forfeiture
Plaintiff

held to

occurred
never

forfeiture must
Thus

since

did not

have occurred,

because

received

the

the

documents

just as

default

was

Thus no such
in this case no
and

the

documents back from escrow.

Any

strictly follow

the

apply.

the contract.

cured

Kessee, supra..

were never returned to Plaintiff, no

forfeiture occurred.
Also as the court commented in Kessee, Supra.
a

provision

for

forfeiture

seller declare a forfeiture
void.

was

construed

and treat

at 604, where

requiring that the

the contract

as null and

"The sellers have never treated the contract as a nullity.

Moreover, the buyer's position is that the contract was

3

terminated, not that it was avoided.
is inapplicable."
the contract
cured.

In the instant

as void,

Consequently this provision

case the

seller never treated

he reinstated it whenever the default was

Also Defendant WELCH

argues

just

as

the

defendant in

Kessee that the contract was terminated, not that it was avoided,
consequently the forfeiture provision does not apply.
Defendant WELCH cites Boswell v. Lyon, 401 N.E.2d
App. 1980)

for the proposition that

under a real

estate

assignor's rights,

contract

make

735 (Ind.

if an assignee and a seller
an

agreement

changing the

his obligation to the seller is extinguished.

Although one holding does appear to favor WELCH the case

is full

of statements and a fact situation that tends to favor Plaintiff.
The case involved one similar to this where a seller
to

hold

a

series

of

contract provisions.
into between

assignees

liable

Assuming that the

Plaintiff and

was seeking

on the default of the

second agreement entered

STONE only changed STONE'S amount he

was required to pay, and did not obligate

WELCH to

pay any more

than the original contract price, the holding in Boswell, that an
agreement between the assignee and the
obligation

of

the

assiqnor

seller which

discharges

the

changes the

obligation of the

assignor is not applicable.
If the above

assumption

is

correct

then

as

in Boswell,

supra, at 745 "The record before us yields no hint of a change in
the obligation ofM WELCH and nThe second assignment . .

4

. merely

gave to"

WELCH "a

new and added security in the form of" STONE.

And " . . . The obligation of,f WELCH "not having been altered . .
. he remains liable as a matter of law."
Anologous to

the present situation may be that of recission

of similar contracts by the vendor.

In

Jacobsen, 79

Cal. Rptr.

301 (1969) the court held that the
"vendors did not elect to rescind the sales contract
upon the vendees default where they made no attempt to
return payments made by purchasers even though vendors
went into possession after purchasers default and
vendor's successors brought a quiet title action."
In the instant case the Plaintiff went into possession for awhile
and no forfeiture or

recission took

place and

the contract did

not end.
CONCLUSION
No

election

of

Defendant WELCH was
contract

and

remedies
not

Plaintiff

took

changed
never

by

place.
the

continued and

position of

reinstatement

that entering

not complete and

into possession as in

Jacobsen did not end the contract.
DATED this

of the

received title back from escrow;

therefore, the requirements for forfeiture were
the contract

The

day of May, 1989.

DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
29 South Main
P. O. Box U
Brigham City, UT 84302

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify that

I mailed

a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Plaintiff's Memorandum in Objection
Motion for

Summary Judgment to Cross-Plaintiff THOMAS K. WELCH'S

attorney, THOMAS VUKSINICK at Chapman and
Street, Eighth

Floor, Salt

Lake City,

Cross-Defendant PAUL W. STONE'S
at

to Defendant's

520 26th

Cutler, 50
UT

84144, and a copy to

attorney, DONALD

Street, Suite 206, Ogden, UT

South Main

C. HUGHES, JR.

84401, this 23rd day

of May, 1989.
DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney for Plaintiffs

6

1

RECEIVED

21

J UN 061989

31
4J

DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney at L a *

L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341)
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
50 South Main Street
51 Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
61 Telephone: (801) 533-0066

7 Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch

8
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,

1

STATE OF UTAH

10

11 NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
12

FAULKNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

13

14

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

vs.
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.

15 STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,
16

Civil No. 2698-88

Defendants.

17
18

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-plaintiff,

19
20
21
22

vs.
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-defendant.

23
241

Preliminary Statement
Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendant Thomas

25 K. Welch's motion for summary judgment does not contain a
26 statement
27
28

of

facts

that

plaintiffs

contend

are

disputed.

1
21
311 Accordingly, M[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's
4

statement [of undisputed £acts] shall be deemed admitted for

5

the purpose of summary

6

Chapter 4, Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration,

7

Indeed, the

8

cannot be disputed.

9

are:

judgment

facts as stated

. . . ."

Rule 4-501(5),

in Welch's opening

memorandum

The most significant undisputed facts

(1) Welch assigned the buyer's interest under the Uniform

10

Real Estate Contract to defendant Paul W. Stone; (2) as a

11

result

12

Contract, plaintiffs sent a notice of default in which they

13

selected forfeiture and liquidated damages as their remedy if

14

the default was not cured; (3) when the default was not cured,

15

plaintiffs terminated

16

escrow,1 and sent notice to Stone that the escrow had been

17

terminated;

18

without suit and began collecting rents; and (5) some months

19

later plaintiffs entered into a new agreement with Stone which

of

Stone's

default

under

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

the escrow, received the documents in

(4) plaintiffs

took

possession of the property

21
22
23

*In their affidavit and memorandum plaintiffs seem to say
that they did not receive the escrowed documents. However,
plaintiffs
previously
stated
in
their
answers
to
interrogatories that they did receive the documents which had
been placed in escrow.
See Answer to Interrogatory No. 3,

24
25
26

28

Defendant Welch's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs,
attached to Welch's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs Affidavit, filed herewith.
The original Uniform
Real Estate Contract did not require that either the seller or
buyer place any documents into escrow,

1

2]
3

contained terms different from and which were more burdensome

4

than

5

assigned to Stone by Welch.

6||

those

Moreover,

7 opposition
8

of

to

the

the

original

affidavit

Welch's

motion

Uniform

of
for

Real

Estate

plaintiffs
Summary

Contract

submitted

Judgment

is

in
in

significant part a collection of conclusions and arguments, as

9 opposed to as admissible facts, and so is insufficient under
10 Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, Welch
11 has filed a separate motion to strike portions of plaintiffs'
12 affidavit.
13
14

Argument

15

I.
The contract was forfeited in this
case because the plaintiffs acted in
accordance with their expressed intention
to forfeit the buyer's interest.

16
17
18

Plaintiffs cite only one case in their memorandum that

19 involves an election to forfeit the buyer's interest under an
20 installment real estate contract — Keesee v. Fetzek, 681 P.2d
21 600 (Idaho App. 1984).

They cite it for the proposition that

22 absent prejudice to the buyer they are entitled to "change
23 remedies" at any time, thereby avoiding the affects of their
24 forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the terms of the
25 Uniform Real Estate Code involved in this case. In so arguing,
26 plaintiffs ignore the distinction expressly made in the Keesee
27
28

-3-

1
2
3

case between the result when there has been a mere expression

4

of an intent to defaultr" which will bind the electing seller

5

only if relied upon by the buyer to his prejudice, and the

6

actual forfeiture of the contract by an act in accordance with

7

the

express

intention,

which

without

more

8|| contract and forfeits the buyer's interest.

terminates

the

As the distinction

drawn by the court in the Keesee case shows, a seller cannot
10

act

in accordance

with

his expressed

11|| without being bound by it.

intention

to forfeit

By acting in accordance with his

12

expressed intention the seller executes the forfeiture.

13

605.

"II

<Id.

at

In Keesee, the seller sent a notice of default to the

15|| buyer which stated that if the buyer's default was not cured

16

within

17

terminate the contract.

18

seller did not demand possession and did not demand return of

19

the documents held in escrow under the terms of the real estate

20

contract.

21

the unpaid balance.

22

court held that the seller would not be bound to his expressed

23

intention to forfeit, absent prejudice to the buyer who had

24

remained in possession of the property.

25

Keesee makes it plain that under the facts present here the

26

Keesee

the

time

provided, that

had

elected

to

When the default was not cured, the

Instead, the seller filed suit seeking judgment for

court

would

Iji. at 602. Under these circumstances the

conclude

27

281

the seller

-4-

that

the

But, the language in

contract

had

been

1

21
311 forfeited

because

the

plaintiffs

here went

beyond

a mere

4

expression of intention to forfeit, and in fact completed the

5

forfeiture by their conduct.

6

In distinguishing,

Ellis v. Butterfield, 570 P.2d

334

7

(Idaho 1977), where the seller was held to have forfeited the

8

buyer's interest, the Keesee court said:

9

Ellis is factually distinguishable from the
instance case in regard to the relationship between
the notices given to the buyers and the sellers'
conduct thereafter.
Our research reveals that the
Ellis notice stated, in part:

10
11
12

[The sellers are] giving you thirty days
written notice of intention to terminate
our agreement of sale for failure to pay
installments due. If all back payments are
not made within thirty days, we will
terminate this contract and have you
removed from the property. [Clerk's Record
at 20.]

13
14
15

16
That notice, like the notice given in the present
case, referred to a future act by the sellers. In
Ellis such action was taken — escrow papers were
withdrawn
and
possession
was
demanded.
The
forfeiture was complete.
But in the present case,
there was no such action by the sellers.
They
decided to seek other remedies in court.

17
18
19||

20
The facts in this case are like those in Ellis.

In this

21
case

the

plaintiffs

have

also

acted

on

their

expressed

22
intention to forfeit.

Indeed, in this case plaintiffs' acts go

23
beyond those described by the Keesee court as being sufficient

24
in

Ellis.

In

addition

to

sending

a

notice

of

default,^

25
terminating the escrow and demanding possession, the plaintiffs

26
here actually took possession of the property.

27
2811

-5-

Significantly,

21

1

3

the only remedy under the contract under which the plaintiffs

4

could take possession without suit was by forfeiture.

5

Moreoverf

unlike the Keesee case, here there has been

6

prejudice to buyer's interest as a result of the plaintiffs'

7

conduct.

8

assignees of the buyer's interest were prejudiced when the

9

plaintiffs took possession of the property and began collecting

As a matter of law, Welch and the other assignors and

10

the rents.

11

buyer's ownership interest in the property.

12

A

Nothing could be more contrary and injurious to the

word

also

needs

to

be

said

about

the plaintiffs1

13

quotation from the Jacobsen case cited as being at 79 Cal.

14

Rptr. 301 (1969).

There is no Jacobsen case at that citation

15|| or elsewhere in that volume of the California Reporter.

There

16

is, however, a case containing the language quoted which is

17

styled Ganther v. Johnson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1969).

18

quotation apparently

19

context in two senses.

20

headnote prepared by the reporting service and not from the

21

text of the case itself.

22

Johnson case did not involve a situation where the seller had

23

even so much as expressed an intention to forfeit the buyer's

24

interest.

251

his intention that the buyers would be bound by the contract

26

and that the seller always considered the contract to be in

taken from the Johnson case is out of
First, it is a quotation from the

Second, it is misleading because the

Instead, the seller had from the beginning expressed

27
28

But the

-6-

1
21
3

effect,

^d. at 385.

4

by

5

property, not pursuant

reason

of

The sellers in Johnson were in possession

their

having

purchased

an

interest

in

the

of any declaration of forfeiture or

6 | termination of the purchase contract.

7
81

II.

9

Plaintiffs cannot negotiate a new agreement
directly with Welch's assignee, and still hold Welch

10

responsible under the terms of the original agreement,

11

Plaintiffs

12|| authority,

take the novel position, without

that

citing any

they can negotiate a new agreement

with a

13

buyer's assignee

(Stone in this case), without releasing the

14

buyer (Welch in this case) from the old agreement.

15

assert

16

purchase price Stone was to pay and the other changes under the

17
18

new agreement

there was no harm

Plaintiffs

to Welch by the increase in the

because they say Welch's obligation continued

under the old agreement and so was not changed.

Plaintiffs

1911
misperceive both the effect of the change in the terms of the
21 J J agreement
20

and

the

nature

of

Welch's

obligations

as

an

221 assignor.
23

Welch

24

personally

was

prejudiced

obligated,

by

because

the
the

changes, whether
changes

made

or

not

Stone's

performance more burdensome and increased the likelihood that
251 j h e would default.
2011 t h e
271
281

original

Stone was obviously having difficulty paying

balance due, let alone a balance increased by
-7-

1

21
3II another $10,000.
4|| support
5

The cases cited in Welch's opening memorandum

this view and the 'soundness of it is also supported by

principles of logic and fairness.

6

Furthermore,

an

assignor's

liability

depends

on

the

7

continued existence of the contract he assigned as between the

8

seller and the assignee or some subsequent assignee.

9

seller

negotiates

10

subsequent

11

assignors

12n The

a

new

agreement

the

assignee

or

a

assignee, the original contract is replaced and the
link

privity

to the transaction and

of

ceases

contract

on

13

depended

14

destroyed

15

Stone, Welch

16

default.

17

assignee

18

to look

19

look

20

Contracts $ 866 at p. 458.

by

to exist.

plaintiffs 1
could

Upon

which

When

no longer

negotiating

or otherwise,

the assignee is broken,

the

liability

of a new agreement

be held
a

assignor's

that privity of contract

negotiation

new

responsible

agreement

the plaintiffs

with

expressed a

for

was
with

Stone's

Stone,

as

willingness

to Stone alone in the event of default and thus must

only

to

him

for

recovery

21
221
23
24
25
26
27
28||

with

When the

-8-

of

any

default.

Corbin

on

1
21

3

1
41

DATED this 2nd day of June, 1989.
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
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7

Thomas R. Vuksinick

81

9

Attorneys for Defendant
Thomas K. Welch
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18
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20

211

This is to certify that the foregoing Reply to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Objection to Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary
Judgment was served upon the parties hereto by mailing a true
copy thereof, postage prepaid, this 2nd day of June, 1989, to
the following:
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P. 0. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
520 26th Street, Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone

221

231
24
25
26
27

281

-9-
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1

DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney at Law

21
31 L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
R. Vuksinick
4 Thomas
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

1
51

(A-3341)

6

50 South Main Street
Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 533-0066

7

Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch

81
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

10
11 NICK FAULKNER and KARYL

)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO STRIKE
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FAULKNER, his wife,

12
Plaintiffs,

13
vs.
14
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.

15 STONE iand THOMAS K. WELCH,
16

)
)

Defendants.

17
18

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-plaintiff,

19
20
21
22

231
24
251
26
27

281

)

vs.
PAUL W . STONE,
Cross-defendant.

)

Civil No. 2698-88

1
21
3
4|j

Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit should be stricken
because it fails to state facts as required by
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

511
6

Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ requires that

7

affidavits

submitted

8

judgment "be made on personal knowledge# shall set forth such

9

facts

as

would

in opposition

be

admissible

to a motion for

in

evidence,

summary

and

shall

10

affirmatively show that the affiant is competent t6 testify to

11

the

12

insufficient/ and inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony

13

should not be set forth in the affidavit.

14

Services/

15

Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation/ 508 P.2d 538/ 542 (Utah

16

1973).

17

matters

therein.11

stated

Inc.,

596 P.2d

Conclusory

1025/ 1026

affidavits

are

Albrecht v. Uranium

(Utah 1979); Walker v.

Generalized and conclusory affidavits in opposition to a

18

motion for summary

19

dispute

20

Environmental Counsel v. Volpe/ 484 F.2d 870/ 873 (10th Cir.

21

1973)/ cert denied/ 416 US 936 (1974).

22

conclusion

23

Hickel/ 347 F. Supp. 1273/ 1276 (D. Nev. 1969)/ cert denied/

24

414 U.S. 828 (1973).

25
26

that

can

Paragraph

judgment cannot create a genuine factual

will

preclude

never

5

of

create

judgment.

Citizens1

The averment of a legal

an issue of

plaintiffs1

fact.

affidavit

Boothe v.

submitted

in"

objection to Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment is

27
28

summary

-2-

1
2
3

comprised

almost

4

conclusions, and inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence more

5

akin to arguments one would expect to find in a memorandum than

6

the

specific

entirely

factual

of

conclusory

statements

statements,

required

by

Rule

legal

56(e)

7|| Accordingly, all of paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit should
be stricken for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e),
9 I except plaintiffs1 admission that they entered into possession
10 I of the subject real property.
11

12

II

13

To the extent paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit
controls plaintiffs1 earlier statement that they
received documents from escrow, it is insufficient.

14
15
16

In paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs' affidavit they state
that

"plaintiffs

I'll escrow."

have

never

received

titled

back

from the

In plaintiffs' memorandum submitted in objection to

18

Welch's

19

affidavit, plaintiffs

20

documents of title or contract from the escrow holder.

21

page 3 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Objection to Welch's Motion

22

for

23

response to Interrogatory No. 3 of Defendant Welch's First Set

24

of

25

actually received the documents which were in escrow at about

26

motion,

Summary

in

Judgment

Interrogatories,

apparent
state

that

submitted

plaintiffs

on

the

plaintiffs'

they did

not

receive any

in objection.

stated

See

However, in

under oath that they

the time they sent the notice of default and forfeiture to

27
28

reliance

-3-

1
2
'

Welch when he defaulted under the original Uniform Real Estate

*

Contract in early 1982.

*|[ No. 3 of Welch's

Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory

first set of

interrogatories

is attached

hereto.
•j|

Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit should be stricken to

°J| the extent it may be construed to be inconsistent with the

9

earlier answer to Interrogatory No. 3. , See Webster v. Sill,

10 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) (A party may not rely on a subsequent
11 affidavit that contradicts his prior deposition testimony to
12! create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment unless
13 there is some substantial likelihood that the prior deposition
14

testimony was in error or that the party is able to state in

15 his affidavit an adequate explanation for the contradictory
16 answer in his deposition).
17

DATED t h i s ^

day of June, 1989.

18

CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

19
20

/

L.VRI

211
22

Jr.

Attorneys for Defendant
Thomas K. Welch

23

241
251
26
27

281

X^xjiinet,

Thomas R. Vuksinick

-4-

1
2
3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
..
"ll

12
13
14

This

is

to

certify

that

foregoing

Memorandum

in

Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of
their Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was
served upon the parties hereto by mailing a true copy thereof,
postage prepaid, this p<

day of June 1989, to the following:

Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P. 0. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
520 26th Street, Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone

15
16
17
18
19

201
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

281

the

-5-

RECEIVED
1

JUN 061989

21

DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney at Law

31

L. R. Gardiner, J r . (A-1148)
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341)
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
50 South Main Street
51 Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 533-0066

4

1

6

1

7

Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch

81

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,

9

STATE OF UTAH

io|
111 NICK

FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER, his wife,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

MOTION FOR ORDER STRIKING
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS'
AFFIDAVIT IN OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

15

TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.
STONE ,and THOMAS K. WELCH,

)
)

Civil No. 2698-88

16

Defendants.

)

12

13

141 vs.

17

18

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-plaintiff,

19
20
21

)
)

vs.
PAUL W . STONE,

)

Cross-defendant.

22

)

23
24

251

Defendant Thomas K. Welch moves the court for an order
striking all of paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit submitted

26 in support of plaintiffs' objection to the moving defendants'
27 motion
28

for

summary

judgment,

except

the

portion

of

the

1
21

3 affidavit where plaintiffs admit they took possession of the
41property subject to the Uniform Real Estate Contract involved

1

5

here, on the ground

61

requirements of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in

that paragraph 5 fails to satisfy the

7

that it fails to set forth facts as would be admissible in
8 evidence,
states conclusions, including legal
91conclusions,andnot instead
supported by facts, and on the further grounds

1

10

111

set forth in the accompanying memorandum.
DATED this(~^,

day of June, 1989.
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CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

13
14
L/'JK^Gafdiner, Jr
Thomas R. Vuksinick

15
16

Attorneys for Defendant
Thomas K. Welch
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18
19
20
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22
23
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26
27
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1

2

3
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1
5

1
61

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing Motion for Order

Striking

prepaid, this p ^

..
1°||
..
11||

13
14

Plaintiffs' Affidavit

in Objection

day of June, to the following:
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P. 0. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
520 26th Street, Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

to

the parties hereto by mailing a true copy thereof, postage

81

12

of

Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon

7
91

Portion

y^^-^Y^

